



Reviving 287(g) Agreements Under the New Administration: Implementation, Concerns, and Implications

Introduction

The Trump administration has made the revival and expansion of [287\(g\) agreements](#) a central pillar of its immigration enforcement strategy, urging law enforcement agencies nationwide to take a more active role in federal immigration efforts. Since January 2025, the administration has moved swiftly to sign [hundreds of new agreements](#), aiming to dramatically increase the number of [local officers deputized](#) to perform immigration enforcement functions. As part of this effort to reinvigorate 287(g) agreements, the Trump administration announced it would be reinstating the 287(g) [Task Force Model](#) (TFM) through [Executive Order 14159](#), "Protecting the American People Against Invasion." This push is not limited to a single model; it encompasses the full range of 287(g) options, including the Jail Enforcement Model, the Warrant Service Officer Model, and, most notably, the Task Force Model. The administration's message is clear: with Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) limited resources, local law enforcement is expected to serve as a "force multiplier" in the largest interior immigration enforcement campaign in recent history. As of mid-March 2025, ICE had only about 6,000 deportation agents nationwide, and the agency is increasingly reliant upon local LEAs to accomplish Trump's aggressive deportation quotas.

By definition, 287(g) agreements offer agencies a formalized framework for collaboration with federal authorities, access to additional training, and a direct role in addressing community concerns about crime and public safety. Yet, as a result, the program brings new operational demands, including training requirements, increased administrative responsibilities, and heightened scrutiny from both the public and advocacy groups. The return of the Task Force Model, in particular, means that officers may now be called upon to enforce immigration laws during routine patrols and community interactions, raising questions about resource allocation, liability, and the impact on community trust. To examine the Trump administration's nascent efforts to expand the 287(g), this paper reviews the different models of 287(g) agreements, outlines the operational and legal implications of renewed participation, and considers the broader effects on public safety, agency resources, and community relations.

Background

The [287\(g\)](#) program, established in 1996 through the [Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act](#) (IIRAIRA), authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enter into formal agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies to delegate specified, expanded immigration enforcement powers. These

agreements have been voluntary; state and local jurisdictions choose whether to enter into a 287(g) agreement and negotiate the agreement's specifics with the federal government.¹ By signing a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and entering into these agreements, the state or local law enforcement entity and the federal government agree to utilize one of four models of cooperation: the Jail Enforcement model, the Task Force model, a hybrid of the two previous models, or the Warrant Service Officer model. As of [December 2024](#), prior to President Trump re-assuming office, ICE had 287(g) Jail Enforcement Model agreements with 60 law enforcement agencies in 16 states and Warrant Service Officer agreements with 75 law enforcement agencies in 11 states.

Officer Training Requirements

Under 287(g) agreements, officers from participating law enforcement agencies receive extensive training to perform delegated immigration enforcement functions. The standard basic [training](#) program for deputized 287(g) officers consists of a comprehensive four-week Immigration Authority Delegation Program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Charleston, South Carolina. As described by ICE, the training includes instruction on immigration law, using ICE databases, multi-cultural communication, and avoiding racial profiling. Additionally, officers must complete a one-week refresher training program every two years to maintain their certification. The less-expansive Warrant Service Officer model is an exception to these training requirements, [requiring](#) only eight hours of training rather than the whole four-week program. Sheriffs participating in the 287(g) program under the second Trump administration have [reported](#) that the administration is significantly scaling back these requirements. The four-week training will allegedly be replaced by a five-day course, and other hourly training requirements are also being reduced.

Delegated Authorities

Law enforcement officers deputized through participation in a 287(g) agreement are authorized to perform specific immigration enforcement functions, though the exact scope varies by program model. These authorities [include](#):

- Interviewing individuals to ascertain their immigration status
- Checking DHS databases for information on individuals
- Issuing immigration detainers to hold individuals until ICE takes custody
- Entering data into ICE's database and case management system

¹ Recently adopted and proposed state laws are creating a complex patchwork of mandatory 287(g) participation requirements for local law enforcement agencies. [Florida's](#) SB1808, [Texas's](#) pending Senate Bill 8, and [Virginia's](#) Executive Order 47 all mandate or encourage such agreements between various state and/or local law enforcement agencies and ICE. Such laws may negatively impact community trust with law enforcement agencies as well as presenting practical concerns about resource allocation, given 287(g)'s costs and manpower requirements for local jurisdictions.

- Issuing a Notice to Appear (NTA), which is the official charging document that begins the removal process
- Making recommendations for voluntary departure in place of formal removal proceedings
- Making recommendations for detention and immigration bonds
- Transferring noncitizens into ICE custody

These delegated powers are formalized in an MOA between ICE and the participating law enforcement agency, which specifies the exact authorities granted, supervision requirements, and program objectives. The MOA also establishes that ICE maintains ultimate authority over all immigration enforcement decisions made by deputized officers. All 287(g) agreements include provisions requiring participating agencies to abide by federal civil rights laws and DHS/ICE policies, including those related to the use of force, racial profiling, and the handling of complaints. The agreements also specify that deputized officers remain employees of their local agencies, not federal employees, even when exercising their delegated immigration authorities.

Revival of the Task Force Model by the Trump Administration

In February 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14159, "[Protecting the American People Against Invasion](#)," which outlined an aggressive framework for immigration enforcement. The order directed DHS to maximize the use of state and local law enforcement agencies in enforcing federal immigration laws, specifically through expanded participation in 287(g) agreements. The executive order states that the Secretary of Homeland Security may structure each agreement under Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act "in the manner that provides the most effective model for enforcing Federal immigration laws in that jurisdiction." As it significantly ramps up interior immigration [enforcement efforts](#), the Trump administration has moved swiftly to revive the TFM as part of its broader strategy. Since January 2025, ICE has actively recruited hundreds of new jurisdictions to participate in the revived TFM program, moving rapidly in states with Republican governors and those that have passed legislation mandating cooperation with federal immigration authorities.

Indeed, several Republican-led states have already introduced legislation or executive directives mandating participation in 287(g) agreements to expand collaboration between local law enforcement and ICE. [Florida](#) has emerged as a key participant, with nearly 100 law enforcement agencies opting into the program as of March 2025. Florida's [SB1808](#), enacted in 2022, requires all law enforcement agencies operating detention facilities to enter into 287(g) agreements with ICE. [Virginia](#) Governor Glenn Youngkin issued Executive Order 47 on February 27, 2025, directing the Virginia State Police and Department of Corrections to enter into TFM and JEM agreements, respectively, while encouraging (but not mandating) local jails statewide to certify cooperation with ICE. Proposed [Texas](#) Senate Bill 8, which passed the Texas Senate on April 1, 2025 and awaits action in the Texas House of Representatives, would require sheriffs in urban counties with populations exceeding 100,000 to enter into 287(g) agreements with ICE, allowing deputies and jailers to receive training and authority to enforce immigration laws. These developments reflect a broader trend among

Republican-led states to mandate cooperation with federal immigration authorities through formalized agreements.

As part of its expansion strategy, ICE released updated data showing significant growth in participation in 287(g) agreements. Between January 20, 2025 and March 11, 2025, ICE trained [625 individual participants](#) across 141 law enforcement agencies in 16 states under TFM agreements. As of April 14, 2025, ICE had signed more than [450 MOAs](#) for 287(g) programs across 38 states. These agreements included:

- Jail Enforcement Model (JEM): Agreements with 86 law enforcement agencies in 25 states.
- Warrant Service Officer Model (WSOM): Agreements with 180 law enforcement agencies in 27 states.
- Task Force Model (TFM): Agreements with 190 law enforcement agencies in 23 states.

Of note, as of April 14, 184 agencies across 28 states have adopted multiple support types. The most common combinations currently involve Jail Enforcement Model + Warrant Service Officer agreements, but ten law enforcement agencies have already signed both JEM + TFM agreements.² This combination is reminiscent of the previously discontinued Hybrid Model, discussed in further detail below.

To accelerate program expansion and reduce costs for participating jurisdictions, the Trump administration is reportedly considering establishing [regional training centers](#) to replace the centralized four-week program at FLETC in South Carolina. ICE is also introducing a condensed training curriculum for TFM participants, consisting of a [40-hour online course](#) covering immigration law, civil rights protections, cross-cultural communication, liability issues, and complaint procedures. The new curriculum represents a significant reduction from the traditional four-week program, reducing or eliminating travel-related expenses for smaller departments and increasing accessibility for rural jurisdictions while raising questions about whether deputized officers will receive sufficient training to carry out these extensive immigration enforcement duties.

Administration “border czar” Tom Homan has also [proposed](#) further scaling back training requirements for participation in the TFM to just two weeks and offered to provide “full-scale indemnification” to participating jurisdictions that face civil rights and/or constitutional lawsuits related to their participation in the program. Critics have noted that while DHS can offer legal support and defense for participating agencies, it [cannot](#) fully shield municipalities or officers from liability under federal civil rights statutes or state tort laws.

Comparing 287(g) Agreement Models

² As of April 14, 2025, the following agencies have [signed](#) both Task Force Model and Jail Enforcement Model agreements with ICE: Clay County, Collier County, Hernando County, Jacksonville, and Lee County Sheriff’s Offices in Florida; Calhoun County, Goliad County, Jim Wells County, and Smith County Sheriff’s Offices in Texas; and Washington County Sheriff’s Office in Utah. These agencies are among a small subset nationwide to participate in both forms of ICE partnership simultaneously.

1. Jail Enforcement Model (JEM)

The [JEM](#) allows designated local law enforcement officers to identify and process removable non-citizens who have been arrested and booked into local jails for state or local criminal offenses. This model is designed to facilitate the transfer of individuals from criminal custody to immigration custody once their local charges are resolved through the use of [immigration detainers](#) and other forms of coordination with federal authorities. Officers operating under this model work within the confines of detention facilities, screening arrestees for immigration status and initiating removal proceedings for those found to be in violation of immigration laws.

This model operates as a conduit between local criminal justice systems and federal immigration enforcement, allowing ICE to more efficiently identify and process potentially removable individuals who are already in custody for other offenses. While promoted as an effort to [target](#) "criminal aliens," JEM has been underwhelming in delivering these outcomes. Data shows that approximately half of all detainers issued through the program were for people who had committed misdemeanors and traffic offenses, not serious crimes. For example, a 2010 report by the DHS Office of Inspector General [found](#) that in a sampling of 280 individuals at four program sites, only 9 percent fell within the serious offender "Priority I" category, while 47 percent were in the lowest-priority category with low-level misdemeanors and traffic violations.

2. Task Force Model (TFM)

The [TFM](#) allows deputized officers to enforce immigration laws during routine policing activities, perform specific immigration enforcement functions, and effectively serve as an extension of ICE in local communities. This means that during traffic stops, community patrols, or other law enforcement encounters, these officers can:

- Question individuals about their immigration status if they have reasonable suspicion that the person may be unlawfully present
- Access DHS databases to verify immigration status
- Place immigration detainers on individuals they determine to be removable
- Make arrests for civil immigration violations without requiring a separate criminal charge
- Process immigration paperwork to initiate removal proceedings.

ICE publications often describe both TFM and JEM agreements as a "force multiplier." However, unlike the JEM, which limits immigration enforcement to detention facilities, TFM officers actively identify and apprehend potentially removable individuals in the field. This creates significantly higher public visibility of immigration enforcement actions and increases the likelihood of encounters with the general public, including both documented and undocumented immigrants.

In allowing officers to question individuals about immigration status during routine policing activities such as traffic stops, neighborhood patrols, and responses to service

calls, the TFM brings immigration enforcement into contexts where immigration status would otherwise be irrelevant to the interaction. This proactive enforcement approach differs fundamentally from the reactive nature of the JEM, which only processes individuals already arrested for other offenses, and the limited scope of the WSOM, which only allows for the execution of administrative warrants within jails.

3. Warrant Service Officer Model (WSOM)

Created during the first Trump administration in 2019 as an [extension](#) of the 287(g) program, the [WSOM](#) requires significantly less training and resource commitment from local law enforcement agencies than other 287(g) models. Officers receive only 8 hours of training, as opposed to the 4-week course required for other models. Proponents argue this model represents a streamlined approach requiring less time, training, and personnel commitment from local law enforcement. Critically, WSO-deputized officers are authorized only to serve and execute administrative warrants on individuals already in their agency's custody. However, they cannot interrogate individuals about their immigration status or make immigration arrests in the community. The reduced training requirements have raised [concerns](#) about whether officers receive adequate instruction on immigration law, constitutional protections, and civil rights considerations. Before President Trump's return to office in December 2024, ICE had 287(g) WSO agreements with [75 law enforcement agencies](#) in 11 states.

4. Hybrid Model (HM)

The Hybrid Model combined elements of both the Jail Enforcement and Task Force models, allowing deputized officers to perform immigration enforcement functions both within detention facilities and in the field during routine policing activities. This approach granted local law enforcement the full spectrum of immigration enforcement powers, enabling officers to identify and process removable individuals in jails while also conducting immigration enforcement operations in the community. As a result of the discontinuation of the TFM, the HM was suspended in 2012 due to concerns about racial profiling and community impact, but it could potentially be revived under the current administration's expansion of the 287(g) program. The Trump administration has not yet specifically indicated whether it will revive the HM.

Examining the Track Record of the 287(g) Program

The 287(g) program had operated under the jail, task force, and hybrid models until 2012, when the Obama administration [discontinued](#) the TFM and, as a result, the HM. While ICE [released](#) a memo saying other enforcement programs were a “more efficient use of resources for focusing on priority cases,” the decision occurred after several [well-publicized examples](#) of civil rights violations in law enforcement agencies participating in 287(g) TFM agreements.

Proponents of the 287(g) program argue that it helps channel public safety threats into immigration custody and facilitates the removal of potentially dangerous individuals. The program is designed to foster better cooperation between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies while creating efficiencies in immigration enforcement. ICE's

website states, "The main goal of the program is to increase the safety and security of our communities by apprehending and removing undocumented criminal aliens who are involved in violent and serious crimes." Data [show](#) that over a nearly 10-year period between 2006 and 2015, more than 400,000 deportable persons were identified by local law enforcement officials acting under the authority of 287(g) agreements. Supporters characterize the program as a useful "[force multiplier](#)" for ICE's [Criminal Alien Program](#). Moreover, the JE, the HM, and the WSO models are seen as creating more efficient jail transfers, which proponents argue is preferable to having ICE conduct operations in communities to apprehend individuals that could potentially create [risks](#) to officers and the public.

Financial and Resource Burdens

As discussed, while ICE [covers](#) the cost of training itself, training requirements impose significant financial burdens on local law enforcement agencies. These costs include salaries, benefits, overtime, travel, and per diems for officers during their four-week training period in South Carolina. The training time can also create law enforcement officer shortages, especially for smaller departments that cannot spare officers for extended periods. Some jurisdictions have found these expenses prohibitive. For example, [Harris County, Texas](#), terminated its 287(g) agreement in 2017, redirecting the \$675,000 spent annually on the program toward other public safety priorities, including improving clearance rates of major crimes. Additionally, [Prince William County, Virginia](#), faced budget challenges arising from participating in the program, including \$6.4 million in costs in its first year.

Impact on Public Safety

A 2018 [study](#) by the Cato Institute examining 287(g)'s implementation across multiple counties in North Carolina found "no evidence to suggest that 287(g) programs had a significant impact on crime in North Carolina." Some observers have suggested the program may, instead, [harm](#) public safety by prioritizing immigration enforcement against individuals who pose limited threats to public safety over more pressing concerns like violent crime. For example, in [Maricopa County, Arizona](#), in September 2008, the sheriff's office had 77,949 outstanding warrants, including a record high of 42,297 felony warrants, yet resources were actively being diverted to immigration enforcement. Deputies failed to meet the county's standard for response times for life-threatening emergencies, with two-thirds of patrol cars arriving late to the most serious calls for police assistance.

Community Trust Issues

Multiple studies have documented a significant "[chilling effect](#)" on community trust and public safety due to the implementation of 287(g) agreements. Recent experimental research [demonstrates](#) that when local police engage in immigration enforcement, undocumented immigrants become statistically less likely to trust officers to protect their safety, safeguard witness confidentiality, or uphold equal rights—critical factors for community cooperation. This lack of trust is exacerbated by the TFM's integration of

immigration scrutiny into routine policing, such as traffic stops and neighborhood patrols, which blurs the line between public safety and federal deportation priorities. The study found that local law enforcement officials working with ICE directly reduces crime reporting rates, as immigrants fear interactions could lead to detention or family separation. The consequences extend beyond undocumented populations. A 2013 study of Prince William County, Virginia's participation in the 287(g) program found that it had "created fear and a sense of being unwelcome among immigrants in general" and "a serious ethnic gap in perception of the police."

Civil Rights Concerns

Some jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements have been associated with abuses and violations of civil rights and due process, especially under the TFM. A comprehensive ACLU review revealed that "racial profiling, poor jail conditions and other civil rights violations are widespread among the 142 state and local law enforcement agencies" participating in the program as of April 2022. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has previously found evidence of racial profiling in some jurisdictions implementing the program, and DHS has ended several 287(g) agreements early because of such findings.

Conclusion

The rapid expansion of the 287(g) program, including a reinstatement of the Task Force Model, represents a significant shift in immigration enforcement strategy, moving operations from jails into communities. Section 287(g) agreements often create significant costs for local law enforcement agencies and complicate community relationships. Substantial evidence, derived from prior implementation of the TFM, suggests that this approach will lead to divert resources from local public safety priorities and undermine community trust in law enforcement, while potentially also leading to litigation over racial profiling and other civil rights violations.

The second Trump administration will continue to encourage, if not require, local law enforcement agencies to take on responsibilities typically reserved for federal immigration enforcement agencies. The administration's reliance on local law enforcement as "force multipliers" raises concerns about resource allocation, particularly for smaller departments that may struggle with manpower shortages due to training requirements and increased immigration enforcement workloads. Increasing participation in 287(g) may also shift focus and resources away from violent crime investigations toward civil immigration enforcement, which could harm public safety overall. As ICE continues its recruitment efforts and expands training options for new jurisdictions under 287(g) agreements, careful monitoring will be essential to ensure compliance with the law and efforts to prevent erosion of community trust arising from the agreements.